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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The same day Appellant William Krieger fell victim to 
a credit card scam and discovered a fraudulent $657 charge 
on his bill, he protested to his card issuer, Bank of America 
(BANA),1 and was told both that the charge would be 
removed and that, pending “additional information,” BANA 
considered the matter resolved.  And indeed, Krieger’s next 
bill reflected a $657 credit.  But over a month later Krieger 
opened his mail to some particularly unwelcome additional 
                                              
1 We refer here to Appellee as “BANA” as that is how 
Bank of America refers to itself throughout its briefing. 
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information: BANA was rebilling him for the charge.  He 
disputed it again, this time in writing, but after BANA replied 
that nothing would be done, he paid his monthly statement 
and then filed this action, alleging BANA violated two 
consumer protection laws: the Fair Credit Billing Act, which 
requires a creditor to take certain steps to correct billing 
errors, and the unauthorized-use provision of the Truth in 
Lending Act, which limits a credit cardholder’s liability for 
the unauthorized use of a credit card to $50.  The District 
Court granted BANA’s motion to dismiss the operative 
complaint after determining Krieger had failed to state a 
claim as to either count.  Because we conclude the District 
Court’s decision was contrary to the text, regulatory 
framework, and policies of both statutes, we will reverse.   
 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act (TILA or 
Act), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f), in response to 
“widespread consumer confusion about the nature and cost of 
credit obligations.”  Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Tr. Co., 
566 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1977).  TILA’s express purpose is 
to “assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit.”  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).  Serving to “even the often 
slanted credit and lending playing field,” Vallies v. Sky Bank, 
432 F.3d 493, 495 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended on reh’g (Feb. 
1, 2006), and to “guard against the danger of unscrupulous 
lenders taking advantage of consumers through fraudulent or 
otherwise confusing practices,” Ramadan v. Chase 
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Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 502 (3d Cir. 1998), the Act, 
in simplest terms, “reflects a transition in congressional 
policy from a philosophy of ‘Let the buyer beware’ to one of 
‘Let the seller disclose,’” Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., 
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973). 
 
To further that policy, TILA generally requires that a 
creditor in a consumer transaction disclose, among other 
things: “(1) the identity of the creditor; (2) the amount 
financed; (3) the finance charge; (4) the annual percentage 
rate; (5) the sum of the amount financed and the finance 
charge, or total of payments; [and] (6) the number, amount, 
and due dates or period of payments scheduled.”  Cappuccio 
v. Prime Capital Funding LLC, 649 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 
2011), as amended (Sept. 29, 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Creditors also must provide “explanations and 
definitions” of each of those terms, id., as well as information 
regarding “borrowers’ rights,” Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 
Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 54 (2004).  All of this information, 
the Act mandates, must be disclosed “clearly and 
conspicuously,” that is, “in a reasonably understandable form 
and readily noticeable to the consumer.”  Rossman v. Fleet 
Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 
 While TILA offers a “range of remedies to achieve its 
goals,” Vallies v. Sky Bank (Vallies II), 591 F.3d 152, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2009), central among them are consumer suits, which 
Congress sought to “encourag[e] . . . to deter violations of the 
Act,” Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374–75 
(3d Cir. 2000).  TILA provides a private right of action, 15 
U.S.C. § 1640(a), to all “consumers who suffer damages as a 
result of a creditor’s failure to comply with TILA’s 
provisions.”  Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 
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U.S. 232, 235 (2004).  Section 1640(a) permits recovery of 
actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees, 
and, as relevant here, may be used as a basis for a claim 
against “any creditor who fails to comply with any 
requirement imposed under [15 U.S.C. §§ 1631–1651], 
including any requirement under . . . [15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–
1666j].”  
 
 This case involves two of those requirements: (1) a 
TILA provision known as the “Fair Credit Billing Act,” 
which requires a creditor to comply with particular 
obligations when a consumer has asserted that his billing 
statement contains an error, 15 U.S.C. § 1666; and (2) TILA’s 
unauthorized-use provision, which requires a credit card 
issuer to satisfy certain conditions before holding a 
cardholder liable for the unauthorized use of a credit card, 
including limiting the cardholder’s liability to $50, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643.   
 
1. The Fair Credit Billing Act 
Shortly after enacting TILA, Congress amended it by 
way of the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), Pub. L. No. 93-
495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1666–1666j).  Building on TILA’s original goal of 
“requir[ing] . . . full disclosure of credit charges . . . so that 
the consumer can decide for himself whether the charge is 
reasonable,” S. Rep. No. 90-392, at 1 (1967), the FCBA aims 
to “protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit 
billing and credit card practices,” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).  As 
relevant here, the FCBA imposes on creditors 
“requirements . . . for the correction of billing errors.”  Am. 
Express Co. v. Koerner, 452 U.S. 233, 234 (1981).   
6 
 
The “primary” such requirement, at issue in this case, 
is that if a creditor receives “written notice” from a consumer 
that “indicates [his] belief that [his] statement contains a 
billing error” within 60 days after the creditor transmitted that 
statement, the creditor must comply with “two separate 
obligations.”  Id. at 234, 236 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)).  
First, within 30 days of receiving that written notice, it must 
acknowledge receipt to the consumer in writing.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1666(a)(3)(A).  Second, within two billing cycles and “in 
no event later than ninety days” after the consumer files his 
written dispute, it must either (1) “make appropriate 
corrections” to the consumer’s account, “including the 
crediting of any finance charges on amounts erroneously 
billed,” or (2) “conduct[] an investigation” into the dispute 
and “send a written explanation” to the consumer “setting 
forth to the extent applicable the reasons why the creditor 
believes the account . . . was correctly shown in the 
statement.”  Id. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(i)–(ii).  The creditor must 
take these steps “before making any attempt to collect the 
disputed amount.”  Am. Express, 452 U.S. at 237.   
 
2. TILA’s Unauthorized-Use Provision 
While the FCBA applies to all creditors, including 
credit card issuers, Congress elsewhere amended TILA to 
include another layer of protection specifically for consumers 
who use credit cards.  Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1126–27.  Responding in part to the then-
“relatively recent development” of unsolicited credit cards, S. 
Rep. No. 91-739, at 2 (1970), Congress also took aim with 
these amendments at an issue “associated not only with 
unsolicited credit cards but with all credit cards—the problem 
of liability in the event the card is lost or stolen,” id. at 5.  
7 
 
Because, even after TILA was enacted, “[m]ost credit card 
agreements” held a consumer liable for any losses incurred by 
the unauthorized use of a credit card before the consumer had 
notified the issuer that the card had been lost or stolen, 
Congress recognized that a consumer’s failure to 
“immediately discover and report” a loss or theft could result 
in his being held liable for “thousands of dollars in 
unauthorized purchases made by a fast working thief.”  Id.  
What’s more, there was “little incentive” for card issuers to 
“take precautionary action” because any such liability could 
“always be passed on to the cardholder.”  Id.   
To fix this problem, Congress enacted 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643, entitled “Liability of holder of credit card,” to 
“safeguard the consumer . . . by limiting the liability of 
consumers for the unauthorized use of credit cards.”  S. Rep. 
No. 91-739, at 1.  The statute accomplishes this goal by 
“plac[ing] the risk of fraud primarily on the card issuer,” and 
requiring the issuer to “demonstrate that it has taken certain 
measures to protect the cardholder from fraud before it can 
hold a cardholder liable for any unauthorized charges.”  DBI 
Architects, P.C. v. Am. Express Travel-Related Servs. Co., 
388 F.3d 886, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  Under § 1643, an issuer 
may hold a cardholder liable for the unauthorized use of a 
card “only if” certain conditions are met.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643(a)(1).   
 
Three of those conditions feature here.  First, for 
liability to be imposed by the issuer, it must have given the 
cardholder “adequate” notice both of his potential liability 
and of how to notify the issuer in the event of the loss or theft 
of the card before the unauthorized use.  Id. § 1643(a)(1)(C)–
(D).  Second, the issuer may only impose liability for 
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unauthorized use that “occurs before the . . . issuer has been 
notified that an unauthorized use of the credit card has 
occurred or may occur.”  Id. § 1643(a)(1)(E).  Finally, any 
liability imposed may not be “in excess of $50.”  Id. 
§ 1643(a)(1)(B).  The requirement that an issuer meet these 
conditions before imposing liability is a strict one: “Except as 
provided in [§ 1643], a cardholder incurs no liability from the 
unauthorized use of a credit card.”  Id. § 1643(d). 
 
With TILA’s framework in mind, we now turn to the 
facts of this case. 
 
B. Factual Background 
As this is an appeal from a grant of a motion to 
dismiss, the factual allegations are taken from the operative 
amended complaint and are accepted as true.  Trzaska v. 
L’Oreal USA, Inc., 865 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2017).  In June 
2015, soon after William Krieger noticed his home computer 
had stopped working, he received a phone call from an 
individual identifying himself as a Microsoft employee and 
telling Krieger his computer had a virus and the caller needed 
to access the computer remotely to fix it.  Krieger acquiesced, 
but, while the caller was accessing the computer, Krieger’s 
daughter arrived home and, upon learning what was 
happening, suggested the call was “probably a scam” and 
disconnected the computer.  App. 27.  As she did so, Krieger 
saw his Bank of America credit card number flash across the 
screen.   
 
Alarmed, Krieger called Microsoft, only to learn that 
the original caller was not a Microsoft employee.  Krieger 
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then called BANA to check whether the incident had resulted 
in any unauthorized charges on his credit card.  The call 
confirmed his fears: a $657 Western Union money transfer 
had just been purchased on his card.  Although Krieger 
protested to BANA’s representative that the money transfer 
was unauthorized and that his account was “compromised,” 
he was told that, until he received his next monthly billing 
statement, “nothing could be done.”  App. 28.   
 
Sure enough, when Krieger received his next BANA 
statement, around July 29, it included the $657 Western 
Union charge.  Consistent with the instructions he was given 
earlier, he called BANA again.  During that July 29 call, 
however, Krieger was again told BANA “could do nothing,” 
this time because Western Union had “already authorized the 
payment.”  App. 29.  Now “no longer happy” with BANA, 
Krieger told the representative he wished to cancel his 
account entirely.  App. 29.  That, apparently, caused BANA 
to reconsider. 
 
Mere hours later, BANA called Krieger back with a 
change in plans: BANA offered to “credit [his] account while 
it conducted an investigation on the unauthorized use.”  
App. 29.  And within a few days, it sent Krieger a letter 
confirming, pursuant to that call, that it had “issued [a] 
credit[] to [his] account for the disputed charge[]” that 
“w[ould] appear on [his] monthly statement,” and that, while 
Western Union would “have the opportunity to review the 
information and provide additional documentation to support 
why they feel the transaction[] is valid,” BANA “consider[ed] 
[the] dispute[] resolved.”  App. 46.  On Krieger’s next 
statement, in mid-August, a “-$657” credit was posted to his 
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account, App. 49, and Krieger “believed that the matter had 
been resolved,” App. 30. 
 
His belief was short-lived.  In mid-September, Krieger 
opened the mail to find a very different letter.  In this one, 
BANA advised him that Western Union had “provided a copy 
of the sales slip[] as verification of the charge[]” whose 
information “matche[d] the home address, phone number, or 
email address . . . listed on [his] account.”  App. 51.  The slip 
itself, which was attached to the letter, revealed the charge 
had been paid out to one “Amit Rajak,” in “Mumbai,” India, 
App. 64, and the letter declared that the charge was “valid” 
and therefore “w[ould] be rebilled,” App. 51.  In his amended 
complaint, Krieger alleged that he “does not know anyone 
named Amit Rajak” and “has never been to India.”  App. 31.  
Nonetheless, the $657 charge appeared on Krieger’s next 
statement, which he received a week later (the “September 18 
statement”).2   
 
Frustrated by BANA’s about-face, Krieger quickly 
sent the company a two-page letter describing, in detail, the 
entire sequence of events.  In that letter, which BANA 
received on September 29, Krieger again emphasized that the 
                                              
2 Notably, after receiving this statement, Krieger called 
Western Union, where, to his surprise, he learned that, 
although BANA had told him on July 29 that Western Union 
had already authorized the payment, the money transfer had 
not been paid out until August 1.  In other words, before 
Western Union completed the transaction, Krieger had 
informed BANA “multiple times that the charge was 
unauthorized.”  App. 32.   
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charge was unauthorized and requested it be 
“remove[d] . . . altogether.”  App. 57.  BANA denied 
Krieger’s request in a letter saying only that, while it had “re-
examined” the charge, the information provided by Western 
Union still matched that on Krieger’s account and thus 
BANA still considered the charge valid.  App. 62.  To avoid 
late fees and interest, Krieger paid BANA the entire $657 
before turning to the courts.   
 
C. Procedural Background 
Originally filed in state court and then removed by 
BANA to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Krieger’s 
amended complaint included two claims relevant here: one 
under the FCBA and one under TILA’s unauthorized-use 
provision.  As the basis for his FCBA claim, Krieger alleged 
that he had timely submitted a written notice of billing error 
regarding the $657 charge and BANA had neither credited the 
charge nor conducted a reasonable investigation.  As the basis 
for his unauthorized-use claim, Krieger alleged that BANA 
imposed liability for more than $50 by billing him the full 
amount when it had reason to believe the charge was 
unauthorized.  Both claims were brought under TILA’s 
private right of action, 15 U.S.C. § 1640, and, for each, 
Krieger requested statutory damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, 
and “actual damages.”  App. 35–36. 
 The District Court, however, dismissed Krieger’s 
complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  Krieger 
v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 4:16-CV-00830, 2017 WL 168161, 
at *7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2017).  Starting with the FCBA 
claim, it determined that the operative billing statement, i.e., 
the statement that triggered the 60-day period in which 
Krieger was required to dispute the charge in writing, was the 
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July 29 statement where the Western Union charge first 
appeared.  Id. at *4.  Working off that premise, the District 
Court reasoned that, because the “absolute earliest date” on 
which that statement “could have been issued” was “July 28,” 
and BANA did not receive Krieger’s written notice until 
September 29—63 days later—the notice was untimely, 
BANA’s obligations under the FCBA were “never triggered,” 
and liability on this claim “c[ould] therefore not be imposed.”  
Id.  While Krieger had argued the 60-day period should have 
been calculated from the September 18 statement where 
BANA first reinstated the charge, the District Court dismissed 
that as an “inspired argument[] concerning what [Krieger] 
believes the law should be,” and contrary to the “plain 
language” of TILA’s implementing regulation (known as 
“Regulation Z”),3 which requires that written notice be 
                                              
3 In enacting TILA, Congress “granted the [Federal 
Reserve] Board the authority to issue regulations to achieve 
TILA’s purposes,” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 
U.S. 195, 198 (2011), and, pursuant to this “expansive 
authority . . . to elaborate and expand the legal framework 
governing commerce in credit,” the Federal Reserve 
promulgated Regulation Z, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1980).  In 2010’s Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Congress reassigned this regulatory authority to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1604(a), and today, Regulation Z is codified within the 
CFPB’s regulations at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, as are the CFPB’s 
own Official Staff Interpretations of TILA and Regulation Z, 
see 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, supp. I, pt. 1 (Official Interpretations).  
Because the agency’s guidance is “published in accordance 
with the broad powers that Congress delegated to the [CFPB] 
13 
 
transmitted within 60 days after the “first periodic statement 
that reflects the alleged billing error.”  Id. at *5 (quoting 12 
C.F.R. § 226.13(b)).4  Because, in the District Court’s view, 
the first such statement was the July 29 statement, Krieger’s 
written notice was untimely and he failed to state a claim 
under the FCBA.  Id.  
 
Moving to the unauthorized-use claim, the District 
Court initially acknowledged that 15 U.S.C. § 1643 does 
“place[] limits on the liability of a cardholder for 
unauthorized use of a credit card,” with the “[m]ost 
pertinent[]” being that such liability may not be “in excess of 
$50.”  Id.  Nevertheless, construing Krieger’s § 1643 claim as 
seeking “reimbursement” only, the District Court rejected it, 
drawing on our case law for the proposition that § 1643 “does 
not provide a cardholder with a right to reimbursement nor a 
private cause of action.”  Id. (citing Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, 
Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2010); Sovereign 
Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 
2008)).  Rather, the District Court held that § 1643 functions 
                                                                                                     
to fill gaps in the statute,” we “defer [to it] quite broadly,” 
Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), 342 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 
2003), as amended (Oct. 21, 2003), that is, as long as the 
agency’s views are not “demonstrably irrational,” we treat 
them as “dispositive,” Ford Motor Credit, 444 U.S. at 565.   
4 While the relevant section of Regulation Z as 
promulgated by the CFPB is located at 12 C.F.R. § 1026.13, a 
materially identical regulation, to which the District Court 
and BANA cite, also appears at 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 within the 
Federal Reserve’s regulations.  We will cite to the current 
version of the regulation at § 1026.13.  
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solely as a “limit[] [on] a card issuer’s potential recovery for 
fraudulent purchases.”  Id.  Believing Krieger thus was trying 
to use it “as a sword bent on forcing liability through a novel 
cause of action” in just the way we had “invalidated” in 
Sovereign Bank and Azur, the District Court concluded he 
also failed to state an unauthorized-use claim under TILA.  
Id. at *5–7.  Krieger timely appealed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review de novo a District Court’s dismissal under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014).  Like the 
District Court, we “must accept all facts alleged in the 
complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party,” Flora v. County of 
Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), and determine 
whether the complaint pleads “enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
III. Discussion 
 Applying that standard of review, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court because we conclude Krieger 
has stated claims for relief under both the FCBA and TILA’s 
unauthorized-use provision. 
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A. Fair Credit Billing Act Claim 
To trigger a creditor’s obligation either to credit a 
disputed charge or to conduct a reasonable investigation into 
the matter, a consumer must submit a written notice of billing 
error within 60 days after receiving the statement that 
contains the error.  15 U.S.C. § 1666(a).  Here, the District 
Court rejected Krieger’s claim based on its view that the 60-
day period began on July 29, the first time the $657 Western 
Union charge ever appeared on his billing statement, making 
the written notice he submitted on September 29, 62 days 
later, untimely.  Krieger, 2017 WL 168161, at *4.  On appeal, 
Krieger argues this was improper and, because BANA 
removed the charge from his statement and only reinstated it 
on September 18, that was the date the 60-day period ran 
from, making his notice timely.  We agree with Krieger: 
where, as here, a creditor removes a disputed charge from a 
billing statement and later reinstates that charge, the 60-day 
period in which a consumer must file a written dispute begins 
when the consumer receives the first statement reinstating the 
charge.   
In the discussion that follows, we explain, first, why 
our holding finds support in the FCBA’s text, relevant 
guidance from the CFPB, and the consumer-protection 
policies undergirding both TILA and the FCBA, and, second, 
why the District Court misapplied Regulation Z in reaching 
the opposite result and dismissing Krieger’s FCBA claim.    
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1. Selecting the Operative Statement in Light 
of the FCBA’s Text, the CFPB’s Guidance, 
and Underlying Policy Concerns 
“[W]e start, of course, with the statutory text[.]”  
Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013).  The FCBA 
requires that a consumer dispute a billing error only where he 
“belie[ves] that [his] statement contains a billing error.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1666(a)(2).  In other words, where the statement 
does not contain any errors, the FCBA does not impose any 
obligation on the consumer at all.  And that makes perfect 
sense.  The consumer’s goal in filing a written notice of 
billing error is to require the creditor either to correct the error 
or to conduct a reasonable investigation of the claim.  Id. 
§ 1666(a)(3)(B).  Where there is no error, notice would be 
nonsensical, as was the case here.  When Krieger received his 
August billing statement—which not only did not list the 
Western Union charge, but, indeed, credited the charge to his 
account—there was no longer anything to dispute because 
Krieger had no reason to “belie[ve] that [his] statement 
contain[ed] a billing error.”  To put a fine point on it, had 
BANA not reinstated the charge, there would have been no 
basis for Krieger to bring an FCBA claim nor any practical 
reason to do so.  Only when BANA decided to reinstate the 
charge did the FCBA once again become relevant, and, for 
that reason, only then did the 60-day period begin to run.   
This conclusion also comports with CFPB guidance.  
The agency has specified that, where there is a billing error 
but the creditor initially fails to send a billing statement, the 
60-day period will begin to “run[] from the time the statement 
should have been sent,” but “[o]nce the statement is 
provided,” the consumer will have “another 60 days to assert 
any billing errors reflected on it.”  Official Interpretations, 
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para. 13(b)(1), § 1.  In other words, even where there is an 
existing error that the consumer would have reason to dispute 
so that the 60-day period has started to run, the clock is reset 
once the charge actually appears on a statement.  If the 60-
day period restarts in that circumstance, it would be 
incongruous to hold it does not where, as here, a creditor has 
affirmatively removed a disputed charge (so that the 
consumer no longer has any reason to file a dispute) and only 
reinstates it on a later statement.  Moreover, we perceive no 
reason to think allowing such an extension would prejudice 
unwary creditors.  After all, if a subsequent statement restarts 
the clock even where a creditor fails to communicate the 
charge by mistake, surely the same result obtains where a 
creditor fails to communicate the charge by design.   
 
Finally, we consider the remedial policies underlying 
TILA and the FCBA.  Congress enacted TILA to “require[] 
full disclosure of credit charges . . . so that the consumer can 
decide for himself whether the charge is reasonable,” S. Rep. 
No. 90-392, at 1, and, together with the FCBA, to “protect the 
consumer against . . . unfair credit billing and credit card 
practices,” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).  We, in turn, have 
emphasized that, because TILA is “designed to provide 
easily-understood information to ordinary consumers,” courts 
should evaluate information creditors convey to consumers 
“from the point of view of the consumer.”  Rossman, 280 
F.3d at 394.  Thus, we consider the circumstances from 
Krieger’s perspective and ask what a “reasonable consumer 
. . . would . . . be entitled to assume.”  Id. 
 
So viewed, the approach we adopt today is clearly 
correct.  The same day Krieger first contacted BANA about 
the charge, he was told it would be removed while the 
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company conducted an investigation.  Shortly thereafter, he 
received a letter stating that, while Western Union retained 
“the opportunity to review the information and provide 
additional documentation to support why they feel the 
transaction[] is valid,” for the time being BANA 
“consider[ed] [the] dispute[] resolved,” App. 46, and on his 
next billing statement the charge was gone.  The “only logical 
conclusion” a reasonable consumer could reach at that point 
was that there was “no longer a billing error,” Appellant’s 
Br. 21, and that, as Krieger himself believed, “the matter had 
been resolved in his favor,” App. 30.   
 
To hold otherwise would saddle the consumer with an 
ongoing duty to file a written dispute concerning a seemingly 
“resolved” dispute or risk forfeiting all rights under the 
FCBA, and, at the same time, would offer creditors a path to 
avoid their FCBA obligations altogether by automatically 
removing a charge in response to a concerned consumer’s 
call—surely a common first response when a curious charge 
appears on a credit card bill—and then waiting for 60 days to 
pass before reinstating it.  We decline to take a path so 
antithetical to TILA’s purpose of eradicating “unfair[ness]” 
and “confusi[on]” in the credit markets.  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); 
Ramadan, 156 F.3d at 502.  As we have explained, 
“[a]llowing lenders to violate” their statutory obligations “but 
avoid liability if they successfully concealed the violation 
from the debtor . . . would undermine the core remedial 
purpose of TILA.”  Ramadan, 156 F.3d at 502.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, where a 
creditor removes a charge from a consumer’s statement only 
later to reinstate it, the consumer has 60 days after receiving 
the first statement on which the reinstated charge appears to 
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provide written notice of the billing error.  Here, because the 
first statement on which the disputed $657 Western Union 
charge appeared after BANA reinstated it was the September 
18 statement, and BANA received Krieger’s written notice 
just 11 days later, on September 29, his notice was timely.  
 
2. The District Court’s Reliance on an 
Inapplicable Regulation 
In concluding that the 60-day period ran from the July 
29 statement5 and dismissing Krieger’s claim for failure to 
state a claim, the District Court held it was “compelled” by 
language in Regulation Z to look only to the “first periodic 
statement that reflects the alleged billing error.”  Krieger, 
2017 WL 168161, at *5 (emphasis added by the District 
Court) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b)(1)).  And in defending 
that reading on appeal, BANA contends that its “later 
decision to rebill the Western Union Charge . . . does not 
                                              
5 In fact the District Court determined the 60-day 
period began on July 28, believing that was “the absolute 
earliest date on which [the] first statement containing the 
Western Union charge could have been issued.”  Krieger, 
2017 WL 168161, at *4.  Though immaterial given our 
holding here, this too was error.  The FCBA provides that the 
60-day period begins running only when a creditor has 
“transmitted to an obligor” a statement containing a billing 
error, 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a), and, “in ordinary meaning and 
usage, transmission of the mail is not complete until it arrives 
at the destination,” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 
486 (2006).  Thus, even under the District Court’s approach 
to this case, the 60-day period should have begun on July 29, 
when Krieger alleges he received that statement.   
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restart the FCBA written notice clock” and that Krieger’s 
contrary arguments rely only on “policy” and ignore 
§ 1026.13(b)(1)’s “plain language.”  Appellee’s Br. 20, 22. 
While the language of § 1026.13(b)(1) may be plain as 
applied to a billing error reflected on regularly recurring 
statements, it has little bearing on the circumstances of this 
case.  Section 1026.13(b)(1) provides that the consumer must 
provide written notice “no later than 60 days after the creditor 
transmitted the first periodic statement that reflects the 
alleged billing error.”  12 C.F.R. § 1026.13(b)(1).  Put 
another way, where the consumer initially does not pay a 
disputed charge so that the charge is carried forward 
continuously in successive periods, § 1026.13(b)(1) tells us 
the 60-day period does not restart upon the consumer’s 
receipt of each new “periodic statement that reflects the 
alleged billing error,” but rather runs from the receipt of the 
first of those statements.  And wisely so.  Indeed, a contrary 
rule, where the 60-day period restarted every month just 
because the charge went unpaid, would effectively read the 
60-day requirement out of the statute.  But reading this 
regulation to pertain in the circumstances presented here—
where an issuer makes an alleged billing error on one 
statement, then eliminates that error on subsequent statements 
by crediting and not rebilling the charge, and then introduces 
the error into a new series of statements at a later date—
would be in tension with § 1026.13(b)’s text and contrary to 
both common sense and broader policy concerns.6   
                                              
6 To the extent creditors commonly engage in this 
practice—at oral argument BANA indicated it does so 
“often,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28:9–20—to resolve billing-error 
disputes without need to resort to the specific processes set 
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We start with the regulation’s text.  BANA argues that 
“periodic” simply refers to billing intervals so, for example, 
where statements are issued monthly, the 60 days would run 
from the first monthly statement on which the alleged error 
ever appeared, regardless whether there was one or more 
intervening statements on which the error did not appear.  But 
§ 1026.13(b) does not run the 60-day clock from the first time 
an alleged error appears on “any periodic statement” or even 
from the first “statement that reflects the alleged billing 
error”; rather, it runs the clock from the first “periodic 
statement that reflects the alleged billing error.”  Because 
“periodic” means “regularly recurring,” NLRB v. Food Fair 
Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3, 11 (3d Cir. 1962), it is at least an 
equally plausible reading of the regulation that it envisions a 
series of statements that, on a regularly recurring basis, 
“reflect[] the alleged billing error” and then runs the 60 days 
from the first of that series.  That is to say, where an alleged 
billing error appears on one or more statements, then ceases 
to appear because it has been reversed by the issuer, there is 
no longer any regularly recurring set of statements “that 
reflect[] the alleged billing error”; only if and when the error 
is reintroduced and begins to appear on a new series of 
statements is there a set of statements that are both “regularly 
recurring” and “that reflect[] the alleged billing error.”   
 
And as it turns out, that reading is also the only one 
that comports with common sense and the consumer-
                                                                                                     
out in the FCBA or litigation, we have no quibble, as 
“[p]arties do generally benefit from the efficient resolution of 
disputes,” Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 267 
(3d Cir. 2003).   
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protection policies that undergird TILA and the FCBA.7  See 
Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2267 (2014) 
(statutory construction requires courts to “interpret the 
relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the 
statutory context, structure, history, and purpose[,] . . . not to 
mention common sense”).  The FCBA only requires a 
consumer to give notice to the issuer where the consumer has 
some reason to “belie[ve] . . . [his] statement contains a 
billing error.”  15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(2).  Where an alleged 
billing error has been removed from the consumer’s statement 
and has not been reintroduced, however, not only would there 
be no reason for a consumer to provide written notice, but the 
consumer also would be hard pressed to show any injury 
sufficient to support Article III standing.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016) (emphasizing that 
“standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a 
statutory violation” and that a plaintiff “cannot satisfy the 
demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural 
violation”).   
 
Obligating the consumer to dispute a billing error that, 
from a reasonable consumer’s perspective, has been corrected 
also would undermine Congress’s twin goals of guaranteeing 
“meaningful disclosure of credit terms” to help consumers 
“avoid the uninformed use of credit” and “protect[ing] . . . 
consumer[s] against . . . unfair credit billing and credit card 
                                              
7 Though not necessary for our disposition today, we 
note that, under our Circuit’s precedent, “remedial legislation 
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purpose.”  Long 
v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 
2012).   
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practices.”  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).  And it would be 
inconsistent with the rule that where a creditor has conveyed 
to a consumer information in a way that is not “clear and 
conspicuous” but is instead “ambiguous,” we require that 
those “ambiguities . . . be resolved in favor of the consumer.”8  
Rossman, 280 F.3d at 394. 
 
In sum, Krieger’s notice was timely and it was error 
for the District Court to dismiss his FCBA claim on the basis 
that it was not.9 
                                              
8 Humphrey v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-272, 2012 
WL 3686272 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 24, 2012), on which BANA 
relies, is not to the contrary.  Although that case likewise 
arose in the context of a creditor removing and then 
reinstating a disputed charge, the plaintiff there raised a 
different claim, i.e., that the creditor violated the FCBA by 
“failing to perform a reasonable investigation of the [new] 
dispute that was substantially different from [that for] the 
[original] dispute,” and the district court determined the 
creditor’s original investigation “was reasonable” so that it 
“ha[d] no further responsibilities” when the consumer 
“reassert[ed] substantially the same billing error.”  Id. at *2, 
*5 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(h)).  Humphrey has no 
bearing where, as here, a consumer claims the creditor never 
performed a reasonable investigation at any point in the 
process.  
9 As the District Court did not yet have the opportunity 
to reach the issue, we will not address BANA’s alternative 
argument that Krieger failed to state a claim because his 
allegations reflect that BANA conducted a reasonable 
investigation of the Western Union charge and thus complied 
with its obligations under the FCBA.  Given our holding, we 
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B. Unauthorized-Use Claim 
We now turn to Krieger’s claim under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643, which provides that a credit card issuer may not hold 
a cardholder liable for the unauthorized use of a credit card 
without complying with specific requirements—among them 
that in no circumstances may liability exceed $50.  The 
amended complaint asserted that BANA violated § 1643 by 
rebilling Krieger, and hence imposing liability, for the full 
$657 Western Union charge knowing it was potentially 
unauthorized, and that this violation caused him “actual 
damages.”  App. 36.  The District Court dismissed the claim, 
accepting BANA’s arguments that § 1643 does not give a 
cardholder any private right of action at all and that, even if it 
does, Krieger was seeking reimbursement for the $657 charge 
which is not a type of relief the statute authorizes.  Krieger, 
2017 WL 168161, at *5.  Those arguments, however, 
misconstrue the nature of Krieger’s claim and misread our 
case law interpreting § 1643.  
TILA’s private right of action provides that “any 
creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed 
under [15 U.S.C. §§ 1631–1651] . . . with respect to any 
person is liable to such person” for relief that includes “any 
actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the 
failure.”  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).  That includes “any 
requirement” of § 1643, and as “requirement” simply means 
“a requisite or essential condition,” Requirement, Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 1929 (1961) (def. b), 
                                                                                                     
also have no occasion to address Krieger’s alternative 
argument that the 60-day period should be subject to 
equitable tolling.   
25 
 
§ 1640 thus provides a private right of action against an issuer 
that fails to comply with the conditions of § 1643 before 
holding the cardholder liable for the unauthorized use of a 
credit card.   
 
The requisite conditions are: (1) disclosing to the 
cardholder previously the “maximum potential liability,” 12 
C.F.R. § 1026.12(b)(2)(ii), and a means by which the 
cardholder may notify the issuer in the event the card is lost 
or stolen, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(C)–(D); (2) conducting a 
reasonable investigation of the cardholder’s claim of 
unauthorized use, Official Interpretations, para. 12(b), § 3; 
(3) not imposing liability that arose after it was notified that 
the unauthorized use would or could occur, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643(a)(1)(E); and (4) limiting any liability it seeks to 
impose to $50, id. § 1643(a)(1)(B).  If the issuer does not 
meet these conditions, then the cardholder “incurs no liability 
from the unauthorized use of a credit card,” id. § 1643(d), and 
if the issuer nonetheless seeks to impose liability on the 
cardholder without satisfying these conditions, it has “fail[ed] 
to comply with [a] requirement imposed under [§ 1643],” 
giving rise to an action under § 1640.   
 
Here, Krieger chose to anchor his claim in the last 
condition, the $50 liability limit, because BANA rebilled him 
for the $657 charge after receiving notice it was unauthorized.  
Expressly referencing “15 U.S.C. § 1640,” the amended 
complaint demanded judgment in Krieger’s favor and relief 
that included “actual damages.”  App. 36.  In other words, 
Krieger alleged that BANA caused him actual damages by 
violating a requirement of § 1643, and he invoked § 1640, 
which authorizes him to sue on that claim.  Krieger therefore 
did state an unauthorized-use claim, and in dismissing that 
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claim on the ground that § 1643 itself does not provide 
consumers with a private right of action, the District Court 
failed to recognize that § 1640 does.   
 
 The District Court also erred in rejecting Krieger’s 
claim as an attempt to seek “reimbursement” under § 1643.  
Citing Sovereign Bank and Azur, the District Court held that 
§ 1643 “does not provide a cardholder with a right to 
reimbursement,” but only “limit[s] a card issuer’s potential 
recovery for fraudulent purchases.”  Krieger, 2017 WL 
168161, at *5.  BANA likewise argues on the basis of those 
cases that § 1643 “does not impose any requirement on card 
issuers.”  Appellee’s Br. 29.  Indeed, when asked at oral 
argument how Krieger, having paid the $657 charge, could 
now limit his liability under § 1643 to $50, BANA answered 
simply: “He can’t[.]”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 44:3–9.   
 
 But those conclusions do not follow from our 
precedents.  In Sovereign Bank, after consumers’ credit card 
information was stolen from a retailer, a card issuer sued the 
retailer for equitable indemnification based on the theory that 
§ 1643 would require the issuer to reimburse any losses 
suffered by its cardholders in excess of $50.  533 F.3d at 166, 
174.  We held that, because “§ 1643 does not address, nor is it 
even concerned with, the liability of an Issuer or any party 
other than the cardholder for unauthorized charges on a credit 
card,” the issuer did not have an affirmative “obligat[ion] 
. . . to reimburse its cardholders’ accounts” and therefore 
could not “forge an equitable indemnification claim from the 
provisions of the TILA.”  Id. at 175.   
 
In Azur, when the plaintiff discovered that his personal 
assistant, to whom he had entrusted his financial affairs, had 
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fraudulently withdrawn over $1 million from his credit card 
over a seven-year period and had paid off the card with funds 
from the plaintiff’s own bank account, the plaintiff brought 
suit against the issuer under § 1643, claiming 
“reimbursement” of the misappropriated funds.  601 F.3d at 
214–15, 215 n.7, 217.  We dismissed this claim, concluding 
that the plaintiff’s personal assistant had apparent authority to 
use his credit card so that the charges were not 
“unauthorized” within the meaning of § 1643, and that, in any 
event, as we held in Sovereign Bank, “§ 1643 . . . does not 
provide the cardholder with a right to reimbursement.”  Id. at 
217–18, 222.   
 
Neither of those cases addressed an issuer’s violation 
of § 1643 by imposing over $50 in liability on a cardholder 
even after it was notified that the charges had been 
unauthorized.  Nor did they mention, much less address, a 
cardholder’s right under § 1640 to recover “actual damages.”   
 
The distinction between “reimbursement” and “actual 
damages” is significant.  Unlike “reimbursement,” which 
means “[r]epayment,” Reimbursement, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), “actual damages,” as we have 
interpreted the term in this very context, is tethered to total 
“actual losses,” and, therefore, is “[a]n amount awarded to a 
complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss,” 
Vallies II, 591 F.3d at 157 (citation omitted).  “Actual 
damages” under TILA thus serve to “compensate 
. . . consumers” to the full extent they have “suffered actual 
harm.”  Id. at 158.  That is the relief Krieger seeks here: not 
merely reimbursement of the $657 charge he paid under 
protest but the full “amount . . . to compensate” him for the 
“actual harm” he may be able to “prove[]” as a result of 
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BANA’s violation of § 1643.  Vallies II, 591 F.3d at 157–58.  
Sovereign Bank and Azur do not stand in the way of that 
claim.  
 
As a last line of defense, BANA argues that we should 
affirm on the alternative ground that merely demanding 
payment on a billing statement does not violate § 1643 
because it does not impose “liability” on a cardholder.  
Instead, according to BANA, § 1643 only applies where an 
issuer “impose[s] . . . liability” for unauthorized use “through 
the litigation process”—that is, by “su[ing] a cardholder.”  Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 41:18–19.  By this logic, if the cardholder is 
sufficiently sophisticated to know his liability will be capped 
at $50 and the late fees and interest he incurs will be removed 
from his bill if he withholds payment, he will refuse to pay 
and force the issuer to sue him for no more than $50; but if 
the cardholder is not so savvy and pays his monthly bill—or 
has signed up for automatic payments—he is simply out of 
luck.   
 
Not so.  BANA’s constricted reading of “liability” is 
contrary to § 1643’s text, structure, and purpose.  As for the 
text, § 1643 is entitled “Liability of holder of credit card,” and 
mandates that in no circumstances will a cardholder incur 
“liability” for unauthorized use “in excess of $50,” or for any 
use “[e]xcept as provided in this section.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643(a)(1)(B), (d).  “Liability,” in turn, means “[t]he 
quality, state, or condition of being legally obligated or 
accountable.”  Liability, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014); see Azur, 601 F.3d at 217 (“‘Liable’ means . . . ‘legally 
obligated.’”).  And as we have explained, a consumer’s “legal 
obligations attach” when he “consummat[es] . . . the . . . 
credit agreement,” Rossman, 280 F.3d at 389, and continue to 
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bind him as long as he is “legally required to perform [them] 
under the terms of the [contract],” In re Montgomery Ward 
Holding Corp., 268 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2001).  A 
cardholder is thus legally obligated to pay the charges that 
appear on his bill, and the notion that he does not unless and 
until the issuer brings an action against him in court10 no 
doubt would come as a surprise to Congress, which enacted 
§ 1643 in part to address the “problem of liability” where an 
issuer did not sue over a disputed charge but only “insisted on 
being paid.”11  S. Rep. No. 91-739, at 5.   
 
What’s more, many of the requirements with which the 
issuer must comply before it may impose “liability” under the 
statute would make no sense if “liability” were viewed as not 
being “impose[d]” until the issuer obtained a judgment in 
court.12  For example, issuers, before imposing liability, must 
                                              
10 Of course, as the statute itself recognizes, one way 
an issuer may “enforce liability” is by bringing such an 
“action.”  15 U.S.C. § 1643(b).   
11 The Senate Report on § 1643 “illustrate[d]” this 
problem by describing a case where a family lost their credit 
card and notified their bank, only to learn that a “thief had 
made purchases of over $1,500”—and, even though the card 
had a credit limit of only $400, the “bank insisted on being 
paid for the full $1,500.”  S. Rep. No. 91-739, at 5.   
12 BANA’s reliance for this point on our language in 
Azur that § 1643 “limits a card issuer’s ability to sue a 
cardholder” and “does not . . . enlarge a card issuer’s 
liability,” 601 F.3d at 217, is misplaced.  In Azur and 
Sovereign Bank, on which Azur relied, we held only that 
§ 1643 was concerned with “the liability [of] . . . the 
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have a “means to identify the cardholder on the account,” 12 
C.F.R. § 1026.12(b)(2)(iii), must “adequate[ly]” disclose to 
the cardholder the “maximum” potential liability, id. 
§ 1026.12(b)(2)(ii), and must “conduct a reasonable 
investigation of the claim” of unauthorized use, Official 
Interpretations, para. 12(b), § 3.  Where an issuer does 
“not . . . impose liability,” it is expressly excused from those 
obligations.  See Official Interpretations, paras. 12(b), 
§ 2, 12(b)(2), § 1 (providing that, in such a case, the issuer 
“need not conduct any investigation of the cardholder’s 
claim” or “comply with the disclosure and identification 
requirements discussed in § 1026.12(b)(2)”).   
 
Adopting BANA’s reading of “liability” would mean 
that issuers could pressure cardholders by continuing to bill 
them for unauthorized charges plus penalties and interest 
without meeting these conditions, and that Congress provided 
no claim for relief under TILA unless and until the cardholder 
was haled into court to litigate contested charges.  That result, 
however, would thwart TILA’s purpose of giving consumers 
“meaningful guidance” early in the process, Anderson Bros. 
Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 222–23 (1981), and 
“enabling [them] to shop around for the best cards,” Rossman, 
280 F.3d at 390.   
 
                                                                                                     
cardholder,” not of the issuer.  Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 
175; see Azur, 601 F.3d at 217.  We did not have occasion to 
and did not address the question whether a cardholder “incurs 
. . . liability,” 15 U.S.C. § 1643(d), from the inclusion of a 
charge on a statement even after it has been disputed.  For the 
reasons explained here, such contractual liability constitutes 
“liability” under that section.   
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In addition, that result would contravene the purpose 
of § 1643: consumer protection.  This goal is decidedly not 
served by forcing every cardholder billed for an unauthorized 
charge to pick between twin evils: (1) refusing to pay, and 
risking late fees, interest, and rate increases, see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1637(b)(11)(B)(ii), (b)(12); or (2) paying, and forfeiting his 
right to limited liability altogether.  And BANA’s proposed 
interpretation would not only deprive a consumer of any 
remedy unless he was willing to risk the consequences of 
refusing to pay, but also would arbitrarily and irrationally 
penalize unsophisticated consumers who do not realize a 
charge was unauthorized until after they have paid their bill, 
as well as those who use automatic payment plans, see 12 
C.F.R. § 1026.13(d) (recognizing these plans).  Yet as a 
consumer protection statute, § 1643 is not intended for the 
most sophisticated consumer.  To the contrary, we interpret it 
from the perspective of a “reasonable consumer,” Rossman, 
280 F.3d at 394, i.e., one who is not “particularly 
sophisticated.”  Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 28 
(1st Cir. 2006).  Because it is irrational to believe Congress 
intended to treat consumers who responsibly pay their bills 
more harshly than those who do not, we “decline to base an 
interpretation of the statute on” such a “happenstance.”  
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, 
P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1159 (3d Cir. 
1991).   
 
We conclude that a cardholder incurs “liability” for an 
allegedly unauthorized charge when an issuer, having reason 
to know the charge may be unauthorized, bills or rebills the 
cardholder for that charge.  When an issuer does so, it must 
comply with the requirements of § 1643, and when a 
cardholder alleges those requirements were violated, those 
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allegations may state a claim under § 1640.  Krieger has 
stated such a claim, and we will reverse the District Court’s 
decision to the contrary.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
